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Abstract. Advances in information technology have simplified many
processes in our lives. However, in many cases trust issues arise when
new technology is introduced, and voting is one prominent example. To
increase voters’ trust, current e-voting systems provide paper audit trails
(PATs) which enable automatic tally and/or manual audit of the elec-
tion result. PATs may contain only the encrypted vote or the plaintext
vote in human-readable and/or machine-readable format. Previous stud-
ies report voter privacy concerns with PATs containing additional infor-
mation (e.g. QR-Codes) other than the human-readable plaintext vote.
However, omitting such PATs negatively influences security and/or ef-
ficiency. Hence, to address these concerns we applied the coping and
threat appraisal principles of the protection motivation theory in the
communication process. We evaluated them in separate surveys focused
on the EasyVote system [15]. Results show that the coping appraisal is
more promising than the threat appraisal approach. While our findings
provide novel directions on addressing privacy concerns in the e-voting
context, corresponding limitations need to be considered for future user
studies.
Keywords: electronic voting, paper audit trails, privacy, user study
c©2014 Springer. The final publication is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-319-07620-1_35.
1 Introduction
The introduction and the continuous advances in information technology have
simplified many processes in our lives, for example traveling has become much
easier because of navigation systems. Recently, voting has also joined the fam-
ily of the processes improved by information technology, as a large number of
electronic voting systems have been proposed and are already in use for legally
binding polling station elections, for instance in the US. However, in many cases
(including voting) trust issues arise when new technology is introduced. In order
to increase voters’ trust and detect malicious voting systems, many of these pro-
posals provide voters with paper audit trails (PATs) of their cast votes. PATs
are used for tallying and/or auditing the election result and remain in a ballot
box in the polling station.1 PATs differ from system to system and they may
1 For example, in [5] and [6] voters can take copies of their PATs and audit the election
result independent form time and place.
contain: only the encrypted vote [5], the encrypted permutation of candidates
together with the position of the selected candidate [6], the plaintext vote in a
human-readable format [17], or the plaintext vote in a human-readable and a
machine-readable (e.g. QR-Code [14] and [15], or RFID chip [16]) format.
Beside enabling the detection of malicious voting systems, PATs also enable
an automatic tallying of cast votes. Thus, less time and human resources are
required. However, previous studies [3] and [10] report that voters have concerns
regarding vote secrecy, when PATs with additional information (e.g. encryption
of the vote or a QR-Code that encodes the plaintext vote) other than the plain-
text vote are used. Voters are concerned that this information might reveal their
selections, i.e. voters believe that the encryption helps others to guess their se-
lections, or that the QR-Code contains a time stamp of their cast vote. Hence,
enabling voters to verify (i.e. detect a malicious voting system), decreases their
trust regarding vote secrecy.
Refraining from PATs with additional information is not in the interest of se-
curity and/or efficiency, therefore our goal is to identify an adequate approach to
address these concerns. In order to achieve our goal, we use the protection moti-
vation theory [12] as the underlying theoretical foundation. Thereby, we focus on
its two key principles, namely the coping and the threat appraisal. Respectively,
we developed two approaches: The first approach, which is based on the coping
appraisal, provides a technical solution. While based on the threat appraisal,
the second approach describes the necessary effort an attacker needs in order
to violate vote secrecy. We evaluated both approaches in a user study with two
online surveys, and focused on the EasyVote system proposed by Volkamer et
al. [15]. We report the findings from our user study and analyzed the impact of
both approaches regarding voters’ privacy concerns. The coping appraisal ap-
proach is more promising than the threat appraisal approach. However, the two
approaches provide new and important insights into addressing voters’ privacy
concerns and how these concerns can be positively influenced (decreased) to
increase voters’ trust regarding new voting technology.
This work is structured as follows: In section 2 we briefly introduce the
EasyVote system. Section 3 provides an overview of voters’ privacy concerns
reported in previous studies. Section 4 presents the methodology and describes
the design of the user study. In section 5 we present the results. Section 6 sum-
marizes our findings and provides directions for future research.
2 The EasyVote Voting System
The EasyVote system proposed by Volkamer et al. [15] focuses on voting chal-
lenges introduced by complex ballots and voting rules, e.g., some local elections
in Germany or parliamentary elections in Belgium. Many other electronic vot-
ing systems, for example [2], [4], [14] and [16], are based on the same general
concepts. We only describe here the voting phase, and omit the description of
the tallying phase which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Voting phase. The voter first identifies herself to the poll workers, similar to
traditional paper-based system. Afterwards, the voter enters the voting booth
and uses the electronic voting device to prepare her ballot. When the voter
confirms her selections, the electronic voting device starts the printing process
and all electronic data are deleted, i.e. all voter’s selections.2 The printout (PAT),
which contains voter’s selections, consists of two parts: a human-readable and a
machine-readable (a QR-Code) part, see Figure 1.3 The voter verifies that the
human-readable part contains the made on the electronic voting device. Finally,
the voter leaves the voting booth and deposits the folded printout into the ballot
box.
Fig. 1. The EasyVote paper ballot (printout/PAT).
3 Privacy Concerns in previous Studies
The studies conducted by Budurushi et al. [3] and Llewellyn et al. [10] showed
that voters have concerns regarding privacy of their votes, when PATs containing
information other than the plaintext vote are used [3] and [10]. Llewellyn et al.
[10] conducted a user study at the University of Surrey, UK in June/July 2011.
The user study was repeated five times. In each repetition, which consisted
of six sequentially rounds, took part 12 different participants. The electronic
voting system used in the user study implemented the system proposed by Ryan
et al. [11]. The goal of this user study was to evaluate voters’ understanding
regarding privacy of the vote and the subsequent impact on verifiable voting
2 Note that here voter’s selections are deleted from the vote casting software, i.e. on
the software level.
3 The machine-readable part (the QR-Code) contains the exact information as the
human-readable part and enables an automatic tallying of the printouts. Further, if
two voters select the same candidates the QR-Codes are identical.
technologies. In the user study participants cast a vote in a fictitious election,
and were additionally required to select on the ballot (receipt) whether they
wish to “post” their receipt (anonymously) on the bulletin board. Afterwards,
participants (including themselves) attempted to guess the selection of every
participant, independent whether or not that participant published her receipt.
Participants who chose to post their receipts received a reward of £1. Further, for
each correct guess the participant received a reward of £.50 and lost an amount
of £.50 for every participant who correctly guessed her selection. The economic
incentives revealed participants’ understanding of the security mechanisms, i.e.
privacy of the vote. Thus, in case a participant was confident that the receipt
does not reveal any information on her selection, she would always post her
ballot in each and every round. Otherwise, she would not publish her receipt.
In the study 23 out of 60 participants did not post their receipts in at least one
round, i.e. were concerned regarding privacy of the vote.
Budurushi et al. [3] report about the results of a test election, which was
combined with an exit survey and took place alongside the university elections
at Technische Universität Darmstadt in June 2013. The electronic voting system
used in the user study implemented the EasyVote system proposed by Volkamer
et al. [15]. The general goals of this study were: 1) To evaluate the system from a
technical and practical perspective; 2) To find out participants’ (voters) percep-
tion regarding privacy of the vote. In order to measure participants’ perception
with respect to privacy, of the vote, the exit survey contained two specific items:
First, the statement, “I think that vote secrecy might be violated by the use of
the QR-Code.”. Thereby, participants indicated their agreement with this state-
ment on a five-point Likert scale anchored in “strongly disagree” and “strongly
agree”. Second, a text box where participants could justify their selections. In
the study 79 out of 198 participants were concerned regarding privacy of the
vote due to the use of QR-Codes. Further, the most comprehensive justification
whose parts include most of all other justifications, was the following: “In the
election poll workers recorded names on the electoral register, sequentially. In
addition to my selections, the time and the sequential order of vote casting can
be stored on the QR-Code.”.
4 User Study
In this section we describe the different approaches (two online surveys) which
were used in order to increase voters’ trust and decrease voters’ privacy con-
cerns with respect to PATs that contain additional information (e.g. encryp-
tion of the vote or a QR-Code that encodes the plaintext vote) other than the
human-readable plaintext vote. We also report about recruiting and sampling of
participants.
4.1 Online Surveys
Both surveys shared the same general structure and differed only in the part
that addressed voters’ privacy concerns. Thus, the general structure of the sur-
veys was the following: First participants were asked if they would cast their
vote electronically in the upcoming federal election in September 2013. Second,
participants were asked if they know what is a QR-Code. In the third ques-
tion, participants were asked if they have a QR-Code reader application on
their smartphone. Then, participants were provided with the survey’s specific
approach. In addition the surveys collected some demographic data (gender, age
and education degree).
4.2 Recruiting and Sampling
The participants were recruited via E-Mail and social networks, for example
Facebook. In the first survey participated 99 subjects (38 female, 61 male). 38
participants were between 18 and 25 years old, 41 participants were between 26
and 35 years old, 8 participants were between 36 and 45 years old, 10 partici-
pants were between 46 and 60 years old, and 2 participants were older than 60
years. The education level was as follows: 1 participant had a secondary school
certificate, 13 had an advanced technical certificate, 34 had a general qualifica-
tion for university entrance, 14 had a bachelor degree, 29 had a master degree
or equivalent like diploma, 3 had a Ph.D. and 5 had an alternative educational
degree.
In the second survey participated 94 subjects. There were 61 male and 33
female participants. 44 participants were between 18 and 25 years old, 26 partic-
ipants were between 26 and 35 years old, 8 participants were between 36 and 45
years old, 14 participants were between 46 and 60 years old, and 2 participants
were older than 60 years. The participants’ education levels were the followings:
8 participant had a secondary school certificate, 11 had an advanced technical
certificate, 38 had a general qualification for university entrance, 18 had a bache-
lor degree, 12 had a master degree or equivalent like diploma, 4 had a Ph.D. and
3 had an alternative educational degree. Note that difference of the education
level between both groups was not significant.
4.3 Approaches to address Participants’ Privacy Concerns
In order to address participants’ privacy concerns we used the protection moti-
vation theory [12]. This theory, which predicts participants behavior when con-
fronted with a threat and has been applied to other security contexts e.g. [8] and
[9], but not electronic voting, provides the foundation for our approaches. For
further information regarding the protection motivation theory, refer to [1] and
[7].
First Approach: Coping Appraisal After the initial questions participants
were first confronted with a summary of the concerns that was deduced from the
results of the study conducted by Budurushi et al. [3]. The concern statement
in the survey was the following: “In the election poll workers recorded names on
the electoral register, sequentially. In addition to my selections, the time and the
sequential order of vote casting can be stored on the QR-Code.”: Then, partic-
ipants were confronted with a technical approach: First, the approach requires
that in the pre-voting phase one ore more trustworthy authorities generate sam-
ple PATs, i.e. all possible QR-Codes that can be generated in an election.4 These
sample QR-Codes encode only the corresponding selected candidate(s) and no
other information like a time stamp or the sequential order of cast votes. Second,
to ensure privacy of the vote, i.e. to detect a malicious voting system that has
included additional information in the QR-Codes rather than only voter selec-
tions, all QR-Codes generated in the voting phase have to be compared with the
sample QR-Codes.
Participants were asked to rank different comparison procedures according
to their preference. This ranking included also the option, which enabled partic-
ipants to indicate that this approach does not ensure privacy of the vote. The
ranking contained the following items:
A: Voters have a specific application on their smartphone that compares the
generated QR-Codes with the sample QR-Codes.
B: A trustworthy, external institution, for example the German Federal Office
for Information Security or OSCE/ODHIR, compare all generated QR-Codes
with the sample QR-Codes.
C: A combination of both procedures, namely A and B, is provided.
D: The approach does not ensure vote privacy. QR-Codes have to be removed.
In the next step participants were asked if they would use the electronic
voting system in the upcoming federal election. To answer this question, partici-
pants could chose all or none of the items from the ranking. Finally, participants
had to justify the comparison procedure they had ranked in the first position.
Second Approach: Threat Appraisal In this approach participants were
confronted with the description of a possible attack to violate vote privacy. Af-
ter the initial questions the survey described the voting process step by step for
both the electronic voting system and the paper-based system.5 Then, partici-
pants were confronted with a specific attack with respect to each systems. From
an abstract perspective both attacks described adversaries’ capabilities, i.e. the
necessary effort an adversary needs for violating privacy of the vote. These are
the sequential steps of the attacks presented to the participants:
Attack steps in the electronic voting system.
1. The attacker needs to get access and manipulate the electronic voting system
(the voting device or the printer) such that timestamps are encoded on the
QR-Codes.
4 Note that this approach is only feasible for “simple” elections.
5 In this survey we did not include the privacy concerns regarding the electronic voting
system that were identified in [3], because they are covered in the corresponding
attack.
2. The attacker must be physically present in the polling station to record the
name and time of voters casting their vote.
3. The attacker needs to have access to the QR-Codes (PATs) in order to
violate vote privacy. This can only be done after the public tallying phase:
either during transport or by accessing the storage room in the corresponding
municipality.6
Attack steps in the paper-based system.
1. The attacker needs to attach a unique identifier to each paper ballot. This
identifier should not be visible to the human eye.
2. Then, the attacker must be physically present in the polling station to keep
track which voter gets which paper ballot.
3. Similar to the electronic voting system.
Afterwards, participants were asked to indicate which of the systems is more
vulnerable with respect to the corresponding attack, and justify their selection.
Then, participants had to indicate their understanding of the described attacks
and their agreement that these attacks are possible in practice, on a five-point
Likert scale anchored in “strongly disagree” and “strongly disagree”. Further,
participants had to answer six questions which evaluated their perception of
vulnerability and risk with respect to the electronic voting and the paper-based
system. The last question in the second survey required participants to indicate
if they would cast their vote with the electronic voting system.
Note that we intentionally repeated this question in order to evaluate the
impact of the approach regarding participants’ security behavior and compare
both surveys. In the first survey this question was implicitly asked, while par-
ticipants chose their preferred option to cast a vote with the electronic voting
system.
5 Results
In this section we report the results of our user study. The results of each survey
are presented separately. We first present the results of the first survey (technical
approach), and then the results of the second survey (attack to violate privacy
of the vote).
In the first survey 51 out of 99 participants would cast their vote electronically
in the upcoming federal election in September 2013. 81 out of 99 participants
knew what a QR-Code is, and 44 of all participants had a QR-Code reader
application on their smartphone. Table 1 presents the ranking of the different
comparison procedures according to the participants’ preference.
The option that was ranked on the first place by most of the participants,
namely 51 out of 99, is D. However after the survey, 90 participants would cast
6 In this work we address the parliamentary elections in Germany. Thereby, the tal-
lying process is public, and votes are physically stored at most six month before the






C: A and B D: No QR-Code
1 9 18 21 51
2 21 27 42 9
3 29 41 21 8
4 40 13 15 31
Table 1. Ranking of the comparison procedures by number of participants.
a vote with the electronic voting system in the upcoming elections if at least one
of the options (A, B, C and D) is provided. Thereby, 26 out of 90 participants
would cast a vote only if the QR-Code is removed This means that about 64 out
of 90 participants would cast a vote with the electronic voting system if option
A, B or C is provided. Furthermore, from the 26 participants, seven stated in
the beginning of the survey that they would cast a vote with the electronic
voting system, and 19 would not. Finally, only nine out of 99 participants would
not cast a vote with the electronic voting system. Thereof, five had stated at
the beginning of the survey that they would not cast a vote with the electronic
voting system, and four that they would.
In the second survey 59 out of 94 participants would cast their vote elec-
tronically in the upcoming federal election in September 2013. 72 out of 94
participants knew what a QR-Code is, and 45 of all participants had a QR-Code
reader application on their smartphone. At the end of the survey 60 partici-
pants would cast their vote electronically. Thereof, stated six in the beginning
of the survey that they would not do so. Further, 34 would not cast their vote
electronically, while five of them stated the contrary in the beginning. 82 out of
the 94 participants understood the attack description regarding the electronic
voting system, while 84 out of all participants understood the attack regarding
the paper-based system. Further, 30 out of 94 participants agreed that the elec-
tronic voting system is vulnerable with respect to the described attack. Thereof,
10 had stated in the beginning of the survey that they would cast their vote elec-
tronically, while at the end of the survey only seven of them would still accept
the “risk”. In contrast, 38 out of 94 participants agreed, or strongly agreed that
the electronic voting system is not vulnerable with respect to the corresponding
attack. In comparison only 12 out of 94 participants agreed that the paper-based
voting system is vulnerable to the described attack, while 58 did not agree. From
the 12 participants that agreed, nine of them would like to cast a vote with the
electronic voting system.
6 Discussion and Future Work
The results show that in the first approach a considerable number of participants
still have privacy concerns, because some of them would only cast a vote if the
QR-Code is removed, and others chose to not do so only after the survey. The
percentage of participants that have privacy concerns is smaller compared to the
study conducted by Budurushi et al. [3], 21% v.s. 39.9% respectively, however not
sufficient in the context of electronic voting. Furthermore, half of the participants
that were “against” electronic voting in the beginning of the survey, are willing
to cast a vote electronically if they have an application on their smartphone
that verifies the content of the QR-Code, or a trustworthy, external institution
verifies the content of QR-Codes, or both procedures are provided. This shows
that the first approach is a promising method towards increasing voters’ trust
and decreasing voters’ privacy concerns with respect to PATs with additional
information or more generally regarding new voting technologies. In contrast,
the second approach has a lower impact on participants’ security behavior, as
no significant changes were identified before and after the survey. Hence, this
indicates that the coping appraisal has a higher impact on security behavior
than the threat appraisal. However, the results of the second approach reflect
the current participants’ perception regarding new voting technologies in general,
i.e. their insecurity towards understanding and perception of the corresponding
risks.
Our findings provide novel directions on addressing privacy concerns in the
context of electronic voting. However, both approaches to address voters’ privacy
concerns are tailored to the EasyVote system [15]. Furthermore, we are aware
that the sample does not represent the entire population. These limitations need
to be considered for the design of future user studies. Nevertheless, the results
of this work lead future work in many different directions. In particular, more
research is needed to better understand voters’ mental models regarding trust
and privacy concerns with respect to new voting technologies. The coping ap-
praisal seems a promising method, however more research is needed in order to
improve this method in the context of electronic voting.
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